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0R¶ esum¶ e:
Les cr¶ edits sont plus facilement disponibles et meilleur march¶ e pour les nouvelles et petites en-
treprises am¶ ericaines dans les zone µ a haute concentration bancaire que dans les zones µ a forte
concurrence bancaire. Pour expliquer ce fait, nous analysons les d¶ ecisions de s¶ election de pro-
jet par les banques et leur concurrence dans le ¯nancement de projets. Nous montrons qu'en
augmentant l'externalit¶ e informationnelle n¶ egative d'un gagnant inform¶ e, une augmentation du
nombre de banques dans le march¶ e peut r¶ eduire su±samment la probabilit¶ e de s¶ election, r¶ eduire
le nombre de banques qui sont activement en concurrence pour les cr¶ edits et augmenter le taux
d'emprunt attendu. Ceci a lieu lorsque le co^ ut de s¶ election est ¶ elev¶ e, auquel cas il y a un nom-
bre su±sant de banques non-inform¶ ees qui soumissionnent pour que cela att¶ enue l'externalit¶ e
informationnelle n¶ egative.
Abstract:
Bank loans are more available and cheaper for new and small businesses in the U.S. in areas
with highly concentrated banks than in areas with highly competitive banks. To explain this
fact, we analyze banks' decisions to screen the project and their subsequent competition in loan
provisions. It is shown that, by increasing a negative informational externality to an informed
winner, an increase in the number of banks in the market can reduce banks' screening probability
su±ciently, reduce the number of banks that actively compete in loan provisions and increase the
expected loan rate. This occurs when the screening cost is not very high, in which case all active
bidders are informed. The opposite outcome occurs when the screening cost is high, in which case
there are su±ciently many uninformed banks in bidding to attenuate the negative informational
externality.
JEL classi¯cations: G21, D44, L15.
Keywords: Screening; Bidding; Loans; Informational externality.1 Introduction
Bank loans are more available and cheaper for new and small businesses in the U.S. in areas
with highly concentrated banks than in areas with highly competitive banks. This empirical
¯nding by Petersen and Rajan (1995) is paradoxical when viewed with the standard price theory,
which predicts that the cost of the loan increases rather than declines with the degree of bank
concentration.1 Since bank loans account for roughly two thirds of the debt of small businesses,
it is important to explain why the loan market behaves in such a way. The explanation may also
suggest policies that can improve the functioning of the loan market.
One explanation, by Petersen and Rajan (1995), argues that banks in highly concentrated
markets expect to use their monopoly power to extract surplus from the ¯rm in the future rela-
tionship to compensate for the low pro¯t at the beginning of the relationship. This important
insight is supported by their evidence that the average loan rate in a highly concentrated market
declines more slowly with ¯rms' age than in a highly competitive market. Despite the plausibility
of and the empirical support for this story, there are good reasons to construct an alternative
explanation. First, the observed age-pattern of loan rates can be contaminated by di®erences in
¯rms' survivorship in di®erent markets, making it a less reliable indication for banks' intertem-
poral trade-o®. Second, it is di±cult and risky for a bank to forge a relationship with a new and
small business. When a business just gets started, there is great uncertainty on whether it will
succeed. Since the foreseeable future surplus to be extracted by the lending bank is small from
such a business, there is not much room for the bank to provide a lower current loan rate and a
greater current loan availability. Rather, it is with a time-tested business that a bank can expect
more from the continued relationship and, in exchange for this future bene¯t, the bank can o®er
a currently lower loan rate and provide more available loans. Thus, the monopoly power story
suggests that the di®erences in the loan rate and loan availability between a highly concentrated
market and a highly competitive market should be more pronounced for the not-so-young ¯rms
1The measure of loan market concentration in Petersen and Rajan (1995) is the Her¯ndahl index, which is the
sum of the banks' shares (squared) of deposits in the area.
1than for young ¯rms. This is at odds with the evidence in Petersen and Rajan (1995).
These reasons motivate us to construct a complementary theory on why the observed di®er-
ences between di®erently concentrated markets can be consistent with rational decisions. Our
theory does not rely on any intertemporal trade-o® that the bank makes based on its monopoly
power. In fact, to abstract from the intertemporal considerations, we deliberately restrict our
model to a one-period ¯nancing problem. We instead focus on the informational problem that
banks encounter in screening a project and consequently bidding on it. In particular, there is one
entrepreneur with a project whose quality is unknown to the banks. Each bank decides the prob-
ability with which to screen the project with a costly resource. The screening activity yields an
inaccurate signal about the true quality of the project. The signal is more likely to be right than
wrong. Without knowing other banks' signals, each bank (including those that did not screen)
decides whether to submit a sealed bid and how much to bid on the loan rate. The entrepreneur
takes the lowest bid and carries out the project to reveal the outcome.
The screening, participation and bidding decisions are a®ected by the number of banks in
the market. It is shown that banks that receive a good signal about the project bid, banks
that receive a bad signal do not bid, and (uninformed) banks that do not screen participate in
bidding only when each bank screens with a low probability. When there are only a few banks
in the market, each bank screens with a high probability and so all active bidders are informed
ones who receive good signals about the project. Competition among these banks produces a
low loan rate and low loan market tightness (i.e., great loan availability). When the number
of banks in the market increases, it makes each bank less likely to screen and hence generates
fewer informed bidders. In particular, there is a negative informational externality to an informed
winner and such an externality increases with the number of potential bidders. Together with
usual increased competition brought about by the increased number of banks, this informational
externality reduces the screening probability down below what is needed to o®set the increased
number of banks. The end result is that the number of active banks in bidding falls, the loan
2market becomes tighter, and the expected loan rate increases.
That a decrease in bank concentration leads to a higher loan rate and a tighter loan market is
not an inevitable outcome in our model. It occurs when the screening cost is not very high. When
the screening cost is very high, almost all active bidders are uninformed and bids are su±ciently
contaminated by uninformed ones. In this case, the negative informational externality to an
informed winner is weak and increases only slightly with the increase in the number of banks. The
dominating e®ect of an increase in the number of banks is to increase the number of uninformed
banks in bidding, which reduces the loan market tightness and the average loan rate. Thus, it
is possible that a not-so-concentrated market has higher loan rates and less available loans than
both a highly concentrated and a highly competitive market.
We propose our theory as a complementary rather than a competing one to that by Petersen
and Rajan (1995). By constructing such a theory, we hope to bring two issues to the forefront.
First, screening decisions are important factors that determine loan rates and loan availability.
This is perhaps an obvious point, given that lending institutions often spend sizable resources,
if not more, in screening projects than in other activities such as monitoring. Unfortunately, it
is lenders' ex post decisions that have received much more attention in the literature. Second,
information revealed through loan market competition is important for explaining the behavior
of loan rates and loan market tightness. Loan markets seem to behave competitively when there
are either very few uninformed bidders or su±ciently many uninformed bidders. In contrast,
when informed and uninformed bidders are moderately mixed, the loan market reveals very little
about private information and hence behaves less competitively. The second issue distinguishes
our analysis from other models of loan market imperfections, e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and
Wang and Williamson (1998), that have also examined banks' screening decisions but have not
paid attention to the informational contents that the market reveals from bidding.
A natural framework that can be used to examine loan market competition is one in which
banks obtain private information about the unknown value of the project through screening before
3competing in loan provisions. For this reason, our analysis is generally related to the literature
on common-value auctions (see McAfee and McMillan (1987) for a survey). The speci¯c infor-
mational structure employed here is similar to that in Wang (1991), where bidders' information
is coarse, represented by random draws from a discrete space. In contrast to Wang's work, where
bidders' information is exogenous and bidders always participate in bidding, we examine banks'
decisions on whether to obtain a signal and whether to participate in bidding. These decisions
are obviously vital to loan market competition. Some other models, such as Harstad (1990) and
Levin and Smith (1994), also examine agents' choices of obtaining a costly signal in common-value
auctions. The general feature that our model shares with those models is that a market with a
thicker potential supply does not necessarily produce lower prices. Our focus on the loan market
and the use of a discrete instead of a continuous signal space clearly di®er from theirs. More
importantly, these authors assume that paying the cost for obtaining a signal is a precondition
for bidding. This is unrealistic for the loan market, where it is di±cult to know the e®ort which a
bidding bank has put into screening. Allowing uninformed banks also to bid both achieves better
reality and generates novel results.
In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 examines the simple case where banks have exogenous
information; Section 3 endogenizes banks' decisions to obtain a costly signal; Section 4 details the
e®ects of the screening cost and the number of banks on loan rates and loan market tightness;
Section 5 concludes and the appendixes provide proofs.
2 Bidding with Exogenous Information
2.1 The Environment and the Equilibrium
There are n ¸ 2 banks, indexed by i, and one entrepreneur. Both the banks and the entrepreneur
are risk-neutral, living for one period. At the beginning of the period, the entrepreneur has one
project to be ¯nanced with an investment normalized to one unit of goods but does not have any
internal funds and must resort to outside ¯nancing from the banks. If ¯nanced, the project yields
output at the end of period that can be consumed. Output is publicly observable and depends on
4the quality of the project. The quality, denoted q, is either good (q = g) or bad (q = b). Output
is a(q)y where a(q) = 1 if q = g and 0 if q = b.
Banks do not know the true quality of the project. All banks have the following common
prior on the quality:
q =
(
g;with prob. ® 2 (0;1);
b; with prob. 1 ¡®:
The entrepreneur may or may not know the true quality of the project. This is not important
in the current setting. Since the entrepreneur has no internal funds, under limited liability the
entrepreneur always likes to go ahead with the project if ¯nancing is obtained. The entrepreneur
contacts all banks in the market separately in an attempt to obtain the fund (see Section 5 for a
discussion).
Banks may want to screen the project to ¯nd information, a signal, about the quality of the
project before providing a loan to the entrepreneur. This screening activity is central to our
discussion and will be examined in Section 3. To illustrate how information a®ects bidding and
loan rates, in this section we assume that each bank receives a signal exogenously. The signal
of bank i, denoted si, can be either g (good) or b (bad). Conditional on the true quality of the
project, di®erent banks' signals are independent draws from the same distribution:
sjq =
(
q; with prob. ° 2 (1=2;1);
q0 6= q;with prob. 1 ¡°:
That is, with probability ° the signal is right and with probability 1¡° the signal is wrong. The
information is thus not accurate but, since ° > 1=2, the signal is more likely to be right than
wrong. The above conditional distribution of the signal has the monotone likelihood ratio property
or, according to Milgrom and Weber (1982), the signal and the true quality are a±liated.2 The
discrete signal space not only simpli¯es the analysis but also re°ects the reality that information
is usually coarse.
Although all banks are ex ante identical, a bank is called a bank G if it receives signal g and
bank B if it receives signal b. A bank does not observe other banks' signals. After receiving
2A density f has the monotone likelihood ratio property if for all s
0 > s and q





0jq)=f(sjq). In the current case, the ranking is such that g > b and so the property is equivalent to ° > 1=2.
5the signal, each bank submits a sealed bid to the entrepreneur. There is no cost for submitting
a bid.3 A bid speci¯es the percentage of output, denoted r, that the entrepreneur gives to the
bank if the project is successful. If the project is not successful, nothing can be given to the
bank. Because of limited liability, a bank cannot ask the entrepreneur to give more than what
the project yields and so a bid is feasible if and only if r · 1. The loan rate implied by r is
ry ¡ 1 and, for brevity, we will simply refer to r as the loan rate. A winning bid r generates a
pro¯t a(q)yr¡1 to the bank and (1¡r)a(q)y to the entrepreneur. Clearly, the entrepreneur will
choose the lowest bid (the most aggressive bid). If there are two or more identical bids that are
the lowest, one is chosen randomly with equal probability. Given the signal s, a bank chooses a
bid so as to maximize the expected pro¯t, which is denoted ms(r).
The above loan competition among banks is a common-value, ¯rst-price auction with sealed
bids, where \¯rst price" means that the lowest (most aggressive) loan rate wins. Di®erent from
most common-value auction models, here both the value of the project and the signals are dis-
tributed in discrete spaces. This type of auction has been analyzed by Wang (1991) and we adapt
his results for the current context. We will consider only symmetric equilibria in which banks
with the same signal bid with the same strategy.
First, a bank G bids lower (more aggressively) than a bank B. This is because receiving signal
g makes the expected prospect of the project higher than receiving signal b; if a bank B's bid
makes a non-negative pro¯t, a bank G can always increase the winning probability and pro¯t by





Pr(sjq) ¢ Pr(q) =
(
°® +(1¡ °)(1 ¡ ®);if s = g;
(1 ¡°)® + °(1 ¡ ®);if s = b.
By Bayes' rule, the posterior for the project's success after observing s alone is





°®+(1¡°)(1¡®);if s = g;
(1¡°)®
(1¡°)®+°(1¡®);if s = b.
(1)
3The results are robust to the introduction of a small cost of submitting a bid, see footnote 4.
6The posterior for q = b can be calculated similarly. Because ° > 1=2, banks G indeed have a
more optimistic assessment on the project than banks B:
Pr(q = gjs = g) > ® > Pr(q = gjs = b):
Also, banks' signals are unconditionally dependent on each other, although they are independent
conditional on the true quality. In particular, conditional on that bank 1 receives a signal, the
probability for bank 2 to receive the same signal is higher than the unconditional probability.
Second, winning convenes information (Wilson (1977)) and so a bank may su®er from the so-
called \winner's curse" if it bids according to its own signal alone, irrespective of the informational
content of winning. In particular, if a bank, say bank 1, receives signal b and bids according to
this signal alone, the bid that makes a zero expected pro¯t is r1 such that:
r1y ¢Pr(q = gjs1 = b) = 1.
If this bid wins, the bank realizes that all other banks must have received signal b, since the
bank would not have won if there were any bank G. Thus, after winning, bank 1's information
is I1 = fs1 = ::: = sn = bg and the expectation on the project's success will be much lower than
the original estimation based on s1 alone. That is, Pr(q = gjI1) < Pr(q = gjs1 = b). The bank's
expected pro¯t conditional on I1 is negative under r1. Anticipating the informational content
revealed by winning, a bank will calculate the project's success probability conditioning on both
the bank's own signal and the outcome that the bid r wins. Precisely, the expected pro¯t from
bidding r with a signal s can be written in the following well-known form:
ms(r) = Pr(bid r wins js) ¢ [ry ¢ Pr(q = gjs; bid r wins) ¡ 1]: (2)
7This can be rewritten as:4
ms(r)=(ry ¡ 1) ¢ Pr(q = gjs) ¢ Pr(r wins jq = g; s)
¡ Pr(q = bjs)Pr(r wins jq = b; s):
(3)
Third, there is no equilibrium where all banks bid with pure strategies on the loan rate. The
reason is that banks G have incentive to under-bid each other, which drives their expected pro¯t
to zero; but if the expected pro¯t is indeed zero then any such bank can make a positive expected
pro¯t by bidding slightly below the bid of banks B. To see this, suppose that all banks G bid rg
and all banks B bid rb, where rg < rb and rg;rb 2 [0;1]. Clearly, mg(rg) ¸ 0 and mb(rb) ¸ 0.
Since a bank G always wins against banks B, it competes only with other banks G. If mg(rg) > 0,
such a bank can lower the bid slightly to increase the winning probability to 1 and hence increase
the expected pro¯t. Thus, mg(rg) = 0. But if mg(rg) = 0, a bank G can choose to bid rb ¡ ",
where " is an arbitrarily small positive number. Although this bid will not win against other
banks G, it guarantees winning when all other banks have signal b. Since the latter event occurs
with a strictly positive probability, the bid makes a positive pro¯t rather than zero pro¯t.
The only equilibrium in this environment (with symmetry in each type) is such that each
bank B bids with pure strategy on a rate rb and each bank G bids according to a cumulative
distribution function (cdf for short) F(:) over a support [rL;rH] (see Wang (1991) for a closely
related version). A bank B's bid can be determined by examining the bank's expected pro¯t.
The bid rb wins only when all other banks receive signal b, in which case it wins with probability
1=n. That is,




4The fact used for the manipulation is that, for any events A, B, C;
Pr(CjB \ A)Pr(BjA) = Pr(C \ BjA).
In particular, for q
¤ 2 fg;bg;
Pr(bid r wins js)Pr(q = q
¤js; bid r wins)
= Pr(q = q
¤; r wins js) = Pr(q = q
¤js) ¢ Pr(r wins jq = q
¤; s):
8By (3), the expected pro¯t of a bank B is
mb(rb) =
1=n
(1 ¡ °)® +°(1 ¡®)
[®(yrb ¡ 1)(1 ¡°)n ¡ (1¡ ®)°n]: (4)
For a bank B to bid, mb(r) must be positive for the maximum feasible bid r = 1, as required by
the following assumption (later in this section we will discuss the cases where this assumption is
violated):
Assumption 1 The level y satis¯es:








Under this assumption, all banks have incentive to bid. By submitting a bid close to but lower
than 1 a bank cannot do worse than not submitting a bid; the worst it might happen to the bid
is that it does not win, in which case the bank gets nothing. The bid rb cannot make a positive
expected pro¯t, either: if it did, a deviation to a slightly lower bid increases the probability of
winning from 1
n[Pr(s = bjq)]n¡1 to [Pr(s = bjq)]n¡1 and hence increases the expected pro¯t. Thus,
mb(rb) = 0 and this solves for rb.
For a bank G, the bid distribution F and the support [rL;rH] are found by invoking the
mixed-strategy requirement that the expected payo® be the same for all bids in [rL;rH]. To see
how this works, note that the requirement implies that F does not have any mass point over the
support: If F had a mass point at rm, say, then by moving the mass slightly up or down around
rm a bank G could do better than bidding according to F. Since there is a positive mass of
bidders at rb, this argument also shows that rH · rb: If rH > rb, the expected payo® of a bank
G would have discrete changes rather than remaining constant when r increases from below rb to
above rb.
With these properties of F, a bid r 2 [rL;rH] by bank 1 (with signal g) loses against a
randomly chosen competitor if and only if this competitor received a signal g and bid below
r, which occurs with probability Pr(s = gjq) ¢ F(r). Put di®erently, a bid r 2 [rL;rH] wins
against a randomly chosen competitor with probability 1 ¡ Pr(s = gjq) ¢ F(r). Since there are
9n ¡ 1 competitors and bank 1 wins only when it wins against all n ¡ 1 competitors, its winning
probability with the bid r is
Pr(r 2 [rL;rH] wins js1 = g; q) = [1 ¡ Pr(s = gjq) ¢F(r)]n¡1: (5)
Substituting this and (1) into (3) yields:
mg(r) =
(ry ¡1)®°[1 ¡ °F(r)]n¡1 ¡(1 ¡®)(1 ¡°)[1 ¡ (1 ¡ °)F(r)]n¡1
°® +(1 ¡°)(1 ¡®)
: (6)
We have the following proposition (see appendix A for a proof):
Proposition 1 When every bank receives a signal exogenously and y satis¯es Assumption 1, the
equilibrium is such that every bank with signal b bids rb and every bank with signal g bids according
to a continuous and di®erentiable cdf F(:) over the support [rL;rH] where


























and the inverse of F(:), denoted by H, is




















A bank with signal b makes a zero expected pro¯t conditional on his own signal; a bank with signal
g makes a positive expected pro¯t conditional on his own signal, which is
Mg =
(1 ¡®)°n¡1





Some properties of this equilibrium are noteworthy. First, the bid rb by a bank B makes a
positive expected pro¯t when the true quality is g and a loss when the true quality is b; the two
sides exactly cancel out and so a bank B makes a zero expected pro¯t overall.5 In contrast, a
5Despite the zero expected pro¯t, the strategy is robust to the introduction of a small cost of participating in
bidding. With a small bidding cost, a bank b will participate in bidding with a probability strictly less than 1




b is close to rb. This strategy earns an expected
pro¯t from bidding that exactly covers the bidding cost. When the bidding cost approaches zero, the participation
probability approaches one and the cdf of a bank b's bids degenerates into a mass point at rb.
10bank G makes a positive expected pro¯t conditional on its signal, even when the bid is arbitrarily
close to but lower than a bank B's bid. This is simply because a bank G's assessment on the
project's success is higher than a bank B's and the expected pro¯t is conditional on the bank's
own signal. More precisely, when a bank B wins, the bank's assessment is that all n banks have
received signal b. When a bank G wins with a bid arbitrarily close to but lower than rb, the
bank's assessment is that n¡1 banks have received signal b. The latter assessment gives a higher
probability for the project's success than the former and so rb makes a positive expected pro¯t
for a bank G, even though it makes a zero expected pro¯t for a bank B. Indeed, when the signal
becomes uninformative (i.e., when ° ! 1=2), the di®erence between the two assessments vanishes
and a bank G's expected pro¯t goes to zero.
Second, rL is higher than the bid that a bank G would bid if it were known that other banks













rL > r because a bank does not know other banks' signals and the bid r makes a negative expected
pro¯t if any other bank has signal b (in which case the posterior for the project's success is lower
than that required to make a zero pro¯t under r). In fact, bidding rL makes a positive expected
pro¯t Mg and it is the supremum among such bids that bidding below them, which guarantees
winning, will make an expected pro¯t less than Mg.
Third, the density F0(r) is a decreasing function, which can be veri¯ed from (9) by showing
H00(F) > 0. That is, a bank G's bids are concentrated at low bids. This is because a higher
winning bid makes a higher pro¯t and so, for the mixing strategy to be rational, the winning
probability for a higher bid must be lower in order to make the expected pro¯t equal to those of
lower bids.
2.2 Loan Rates and the Number of Bidders
We now examine how the loan rate depends on the number of banks. First, the highest bid, rb
(or rH), increases with the number of banks. This is because the winner's curse is more severe for
11banks B when n is larger and so, to minimize the winner's curse, banks B bid more conservatively.
To elaborate, recall that rb is the bid by a bank with signal b that makes a zero expected pro¯t
when all other banks also receive signal b. When there are more banks and all of them receive
signal b, the posterior for the project's success is lower and so a higher loan rate is necessary for
making a zero expected pro¯t.
Second, the expected pro¯t of a bank G, Mg, decreases when the number of banks increases.
This result is the net of two con°icting e®ects of the increased extent of the winner's curse
generated by an increase in the number of banks. On the one hand, a larger n pushes up the bid
by banks B and so raises the highest bid by a bank G, as explained above. This e®ect increases
a bank G's expected pro¯t. On the other hand, for any given rb, if a bid rb ¡" by a bank G wins
when there are more bidders then the winner's assessment of the project's success will be lower.
This reduces a bank G's expected pro¯t. The second e®ect dominates because, as explained
before, a bank G's expected pro¯t from bidding rb¡" relies on the di®erence between a bank G's
and a bank B's assessment of the project's success, which diminishes when n increases.
Third, the lowest bid, rL, decreases when the number of banks increases. This is because rL
is the lowest bid that can yield Mg as the expected pro¯t and so, when Mg falls with n, a lower
bid can make such a pro¯t.
Therefore, it is imprecise to state that increasing the number of banks increases competition
in the loan market. Although the lowest bid becomes more aggressive and each bank's expected
pro¯t becomes smaller with a larger n, the highest (most pessimistic) bid also increases. As
the support of the bids widens on both ends, loan rates do not decrease with the number of
competitors in the sense of ¯rst-order stochastic dominance. This is also clear from examining
(9). For any given F 2 [0;1], H does not depend on n monotonically and so its inverse, F, does
not depend on n monotonically either.
Given this ambiguity, we can try to determine the in°uence of n on the expected loan rate.
Let Rq be the expected loan rate that an entrepreneur with a quality q project gets, de¯ned as









The ¯rst term in [:] is the expected value of the winning bid when rb wins. The second term in [:]
deals with the case where the winning bid is lower than rb. To explain this term, note that each
bid is lower than or equal to a level r 2 [rL;rb) with probability °F(r) and so, with probability
[1 ¡ °F(r)]n, there is no bid lower than or equal to r. Thus, the winning bid is lower than or
equal to r with probability 1 ¡ [1 ¡ °F(r)]n, and the second term in (11) is obtained with this
cdf of the winning bid.
The expected loan rate when q = b can be calculated similarly by replacing ° with 1 ¡ °.
Substituting r = H(F) from (9), we have:



















The rate Rg increases with n if and only if ° > e¡1=n. The rate Rb increases with n for both
° ! 1=2 and ° ! 1.
Proof. Substituting (9) for r in (11) and integrating yields (12). It is clear from (12) that
Rg increases with n if and only if n°n¡1 is an increasing function of n, which is equivalent to
° > e¡1=n. A similar substitution into Rb yields (13), but the integration cannot be analytically
computed. Nevertheless, when ° ! 1=2 or ° ! 1, it can be veri¯ed that Rb increases with n.
The most interesting feature is that the expected loan rate can be higher when there are
more banks. The expected loan rate increases with the number of banks if the accuracy of the
signal is su±ciently high. This can be explained by recalling that an increase in the number of
banks increases the extent of the winner's curse to a bank B. When the accuracy of the signals
13is su±ciently high but not perfect, the potential winner's curse is su±ciently strong. That is, if
information is fairly accurate and yet a non-aggressive bid like rb wins, it reveals that the project's
success must be extremely unlikely and, to be rational, the highest bid must increase signi¯cantly
with the number of bidders in order to break even for a bank B. The rising highest bid can
dominate the falling lowest bid and so the expected loan rate can increase with the thickness of
the market. Notice that, in contrast to Levin and Smith (1994), this result emerges here when
all banks participate in bidding with probability one.
The critical level of ° for a positive dependence of Rg on n increases with n, suggesting that
the dependence can be non-monotonic. In particular, if ° ¸ e¡1=3, the dependence of Rg on n
will be hump-shaped. Increasing n from 2 increases Rg but, when n passes the level 1=(¡ln°),
further increases in n reduce the expected loan rate. Therefore, reducing the concentration
of banks increases the competition in the sense of reducing the expected loan rate only if the
concentration is reduced su±ciently.
The above argument that the expected loan rate may positively depend on n seems to apply
as well to the case where the true quality of the project is bad. Unfortunately, the form of the
expected loan rate in this case is too complicated to permit a clear-cut analysis. Nevertheless,
the rate Rb does increase with n when either ° ! 1=2 or ° ! 1.
To conclude this section, we remark on the fragility of the above equilibrium. The equilibrium
relies on Assumption 1. When n is large or ° is close to one, the assumption is violated. In this
case rb > 1 and there is no feasible bid for banks B to break even. Such banks drop out of
bidding. When n and ° are such that








Banks G also drop out of bidding as the expected pro¯t from bidding is negative. The equilibrium
described in Proposition 1 does not exist. Note that the right-hand side of (14) increases very
rapidly with n and so the equilibrium will disappear very quickly as n increases.
The existence problem arises because the signals are exogenously (and freely) obtained by
14banks. When there are many banks, the expected pro¯t becomes negative if every bank G bids
with probability one. If signals are costly obtained, instead, banks will choose not to obtain
them. The interaction between screening and competition in bidding will be analyzed next. The
analysis will also yield predictions about the loan market tightness.
3 Screening and Competitive Bidding
Now consider the case where a cost c > 0 must be incurred in order to get a signal and we refer
to the action of getting such a costly signal as screening. For simplicity, assume that each bank
can get at most one signal. The screening probability is denoted p. Banks that do not screen are
called banks U. After screening, banks decide whether to participate in bidding. We assume that
screening is an action unobservable by outsiders. This is realistic since an entrepreneur is likely to
contact each bank separately for funds. The assumption also simpli¯es the analysis: Since banks
bid without knowing the actual number of banks that have screened, which is a random variable,
bids do not directly depend on the realization of this random variable but rather depend on the
screening probability. Obviously, screening is not a precondition for bidding, since an uninformed
bank can always pretend to be informed and participate in bidding. Thus, the screening cost is
di®erent from the participation cost in Harstad (1990) and Levin and Smith (1994).












The part y > 1=® requires that, if all banks are uninformed, there are feasible loan rates to
¯nance a project and yield non-negative pro¯t. The second part of the assumption is imposed
for us to focus on banks' non-trivial decisions on the screening probability. The cases where y is
su±ciently large to violate the above assumption have already been analyzed in the last section.
The restriction nL ¸ 3 is made to ensure that the interval for y in the above assumption is
15non-empty for all n ¸ nL.6
We will focus on symmetric equilibria where all banks choose the same screening probability
and all banks with the same information use the same bidding strategy. Given the upper bound
on y, the project may not generate a positive expected pro¯t for a bank B or a bank U if all
banks participate in bidding. To be general and for the continuity of the equilibrium, we allow
these banks to choose the probability of participating in bidding after observing their own signals.
The participation choice and the bidding strategies are summarized below.
Banks' bidding choices




cdf of bids Fg Fu Fb
support of cdf [rgL;rgH] [ruL;ruH] [rbL;rbH]
Similar to the argument in the last section, it can be shown that each bid distribution has
no mass point over the corresponding support if the support is not a singleton. To ¯nd more
properties of the bid distributions, let us expand the notation s to include s = u, which means
that a bank is uninformed. Accordingly, Pr(qjs = u) = Pr(q). Let ms(r) be the expected pro¯t
for a bank of type s with a bid r, where s = g;u;b. For s = g;b, denote




For s = u, denote Emu(r) = mu(r). Let us calculate ms(r) from (3) without additional knowledge
of the relative location of the supports of the three bid distributions.
First, let us calculate the probability for a bid to win when the true quality of the project is
g. For any bid r 2 [0;1], it loses to an arbitrary competitor in three cases: (i) The competitor
screened, received a signal g and bid below r, the probability of which is °pFg(r); (ii) The
competitor did not screen, participated in bidding and bid below r, the probability of which is
(1 ¡ p)uFu(r); (iii) The competitor screened, received signal b, participated in bidding and bid
below r, the probability of which is (1¡°)pbFb(r). Thus, a bid r loses to an arbitrary competitor





nL¡1. This introduces additional cases that do not seem particularly interesting.
16with probability °pFg(r)+(1¡p)uFu(r)+(1¡°)pbFb(r). For the bid to win over n¡1 potential
competitors, the probability is
W(rjq = g) ´ [1 ¡°pFg(r) ¡(1 ¡p)uFu(r) ¡(1 ¡°)pbFb(r)]n¡1: (16)
Similarly, when the true quality of the project is b, the winning probability of a bid r is
W(rjq = b) ´ [1 ¡(1 ¡°)pFg(r)¡ (1¡ p)uFu(r)¡ °pbFb(r)]n¡1: (17)
Next, ms(r) can be calculated using (3) and so ms(r) is given as follows:
ms(r) = Pr(q = gjs) (yr ¡ 1)W(rjq = g) ¡ Pr(q = bjs) W(rjq = b): (18)
The boxes highlight the terms where ms(r) di®ers across s for the same bid r.
The important feature is that the ratio Pr(q = gjs)=Pr(q = bjs) is increasing in s, where s is
ranked according to g > u > b. That is, the assessment of the project's success is higher for a
bank G than for a bank U, which in turn is higher than for a bank B. This implies that a bank
G's bids are higher than a bank U's, which in turn are higher than a bank B's, as stated below
(see Appendix B for a proof).
Lemma 3 rgH = ruL if u > 0; ruH = rbL if b > 0.
In fact, under Assumption 2 there is no feasible bid for a bank B to break even and so
those banks do not bid. Similarly, it is not feasible for a bank U to participate in bidding with
probability one. Uninformed banks participate in bidding with a positive probability when the
















Assumption 2 ensures pA(n) 2 (0;1). We have the following proposition (see Appendix C for a
proof):
17Proposition 4 Assume p > 0. Banks B do not participate in bidding. Uninformed banks partic-
ipate in bidding if and only if p < pA(n), in which case they participate in bidding with probability

















and the inverse of Fu, Hu(F), is given by








1¡ (1¡ °)p ¡(1¡ p)uF
1 ¡ °p ¡(1 ¡p)uF
¶n¡1#
: (22)
Uninformed banks make zero expected pro¯t conditional on their signals. Their participation
probability decreases with p and their lowest bid increases with p.
The reasons why a bank U's participation rate decreases with p and why their lowest bid
increases with p are similar. When each bank screens with a higher probability, it is more likely
that at least one bank receives signal g and hence less likely that an uninformed bank wins.
The expected pro¯t of banks U from bidding is lower for any given participation rate and so, to
break even, a lower participation rate is necessary. If an uninformed bank wins despite the low
likelihood, this bank should rationally believe that the prospect of the project's success is low.
Anticipating this, uninformed banks bid more pessimistically when p is higher in order to break
even.
If no bank screens, uninformed banks will surely participate in bidding but, if all other banks
screen, uninformed banks will not bid. Equilibrium screening probability may exceed or fall short
of the critical level pA(n). To ¯nd out, let us examine the bidding decision by a bank G, given
that all other banks screen with probability p. Since b = 0 and Fu(rgH) = 0, the expected payo®
to a bank G from bidding r 2 [rgL;rgH] is mg(r) = EMg=Pr(s = g), where
EMg =(yr ¡1)®°[1 ¡ °pFg(r)]n¡1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ °)[1 ¡(1 ¡°)pFg(r)]n¡1
=(yrgH ¡1)®°(1 ¡°p)n¡1 ¡ (1¡ ®)(1 ¡ °)[1 ¡(1 ¡°)p]n¡1:
18This can be used to solve for the inverse of the bid distribution Fg. Also, the payo® is an increasing
function of rgH. Thus, rgH = 1 if banks U do not bid (p ¸ pA(n)) and rgH = ruL if banks U
bid (p < pA(n)). For a bank G to participate in bidding, the above pro¯t must be non-negative,
















Assumption 2 ensures pH(n) 2 (0;1) and pH(n) > pA(n). With this discussion, the following
proposition can be established and the proof is omitted:
Proposition 5 Suppose that all other banks screen with probability p 2 [0;1]. A bank G par-
ticipates in bidding if and only if p · pH(n). If a bank G bids, the expected pro¯t is mg =
EMg=Pr(s = g); the bid distribution is Fg with an inverse Hg; and the support is [rgL;rgH].
These characteristics of bids are given as follows:
EMg(p;n) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
(1¡ ®)(2° ¡ 1)[1 ¡(1 ¡°)p]n¡1; if p < pA(n)
(y ¡1)®°(1¡ °p)n¡1
¡(1¡ ®)(1 ¡ °)[1 ¡(1 ¡°)p]n¡1;




ruL(p;n);if p < pA(n);

























The expected pro¯t of a bank G is positive for all p < pH(n) and is a decreasing function of p.
As before, a bank G makes a positive expected pro¯t because its signal gives a higher assess-
ment of the project's success than other signals do. Also, as every bank increases the screening
probability, there are more banks that receive signal g and the pro¯t for each such bank falls.
Now we determine the screening probability. To do so, let us calculate the unconditionally
expected pro¯t of a bank that screens (i.e., before the signal is revealed). Since receiving signal
19b yields zero expected pro¯t, the unconditionally expected pro¯t is Pr(s = g) ¢ mg = EMg. An






= 1; if EMg(p;n) > c
= 0; if EMg(p;n) < c
2 [0;1];if EMg(p;n) = c:
(28)
Equilibrium screening probability is such that p¤(p;n) = p. Since EMg(p;n) is a decreasing
function of p, equilibrium screening probability is unique, as shown in Figure 1 by point E.
Figure 1
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De¯ne cA = EMg(pA(n);n) and c0 = EMg(0;n) = (1 ¡ ®)(2° ¡ 1). Note that p < pA(n) if
and only if c > cA. The following proposition becomes evident.
Proposition 6 Under Assumption 2, a unique equilibrium exists as follows:
(i) If c ¸ c0, then p = 0 and all banks bid 1=(®y), making zero expected pro¯t;
(ii) If 0 < c < c0, then p 2 (0;pH(n)) and satis¯es EMg(p;n) = c. The screening probability is a
decreasing function of the screening cost. Banks G always bid and make a positive expected pro¯t.
Uninformed banks bid with probability u(p;n) > 0 if and only if c > cA, and make a zero expected
pro¯t when they bid. Banks B do not bid. The bids are characterized in Propositions 4 and 5.
204 Loan Rates and Loan Market Tightness
The e®ects of the screening cost and the number of banks onthe loanmarket can now be examined.
Let us restrict attention to 0 < c < c0 and so p > 0.
4.1 De¯nitions
A change in the screening cost or the number of banks a®ects both the loan rate and the tightness
of the loan market. As in Section 2, the e®ects on loan rates are complicated and so we focus
on the expected loan rate conditional when q = g. The loan market tightness can be measured
by the probability with which the project fails to get ¯nanced. Denote the tightness as Tq for a
given project quality. A higher value of Tq means a tighter loan market.
To calculate Tq, note that it is the probability that no bid is submitted. There are two cases
where a randomly selected bank bids: when it screens and receives signal g, the probability of
which is p ¢ Pr(s = gjq), or when it does not screen and chooses to bid, the probability of which
is (1 ¡ p)u. Thus, a randomly selected bank will bid with probability p ¢ Pr(s = gjq) + (1 ¡ p)u.
For every bank not to bid, the probability is:




[1 ¡°p ¡ (1 ¡ p)u]n; if q = g
[1 ¡(1 ¡°)p ¡(1 ¡p)u]n;if q = b:
(29)
The loan market is tighter for bad projects than for good projects, i.e., Tb > Tg, even though
banks do not know the project's quality. This is because the signals are more likely to be right
than wrong and so screening helps the banks to ¯nance good projects more often than bad ones,
although the banks' ability of doing so is limited.
The expected loan rate Rg can be calculated similarly to (11). The important di®erence is
that a project now does not always receive a bid here and so, to interpret the expected loan rate
as the average of observed rates, it must be calculated conditionally on that at least one bid is
received. Let us ¯rst consider the case p < pA(n) and calculate the joint probability with which
the project receives at least one bid and the winning bid does not exceed a level r1 2 [rgL;rgH].
Given q = g, a randomly selected bank's bid is lower than or equal to r1 with probability °pFg(r1).
21Then [1 ¡ °pFg(r1)]n is the probability with which no bid below or equal to r1 is received and
1 ¡ [1 ¡ °pFg(r1)]n is the probability with which the project receives at least one bid below or
equal to r1. Since a project receives at least one bid with probability 1 ¡ Tg when q = g, the




f1 ¡ [1 ¡°pFg(r1)]ng:
The similar conditional probability for the winning bid not to exceed r1 2 [ruL;r1] is
1
1 ¡Tg
f1 ¡[1 ¡°p ¡ (1 ¡ p)uFu(r1)]ng:
Therefore, the expected loan rate when q = g (de¯ned as the expectation of yr ¡ 1 rather than





rgL r ¢ df1¡ [1¡ °pFg(r)]ng
= +
R 1
ruL r ¢df1 ¡[1 ¡°p ¡ (1 ¡p)uFu(r)]ng
o
:
Substituting r = Hg(F) for the ¯rst integral and r = Hu(F) for the second integral, one can
integrate to obtain:
Rg =
cnp + (1¡ ®)f1 ¡ [1 ¡ (1 ¡ °)p ¡ (1 ¡ p)u]ng
®f1 ¡[1¡ °p ¡(1 ¡p)u]ng
(30)
If p ¸ pA(n), a similar derivation can be used to show that Rg is given by (30) with u = 0.
4.2 E®ects of a Higher Screening Cost
The expected loan rate and loan market tightness depend on the screening cost as follows (see
Appendix D for a proof):
Proposition 7 The loan market tightness is an increasing function of the screening cost when
c < cA and a decreasing function of the screening cost when c > cA. The expected loan rate
Rg increases with the screening cost when c < c¤, where c¤ 2 (cA;c0), and decreases with the
screening cost when c is close to c0.
The loan market tightness has a hump-shaped dependence on the screening cost. To explain,
let us start from a low screening cost and try to gradually increase it. When the screening cost
22is small, i.e., c < cA, only banks G bid. The number of such banks falls when the screening
cost increases, because the screening probability falls. When c increases passing the level cA,
both banks G and banks U bid. Increasing the screening cost further has two e®ects on the
expected number of bids. First, it increases uninformed banks' participation probability and
this e®ect always increases the number of bids. Second, by reducing the screening probability,
the higher screening cost shifts some banks that would otherwise choose to be informed to the
uninformed group. Since an uninformed bank bids with probability u and an informed bank bids
with probability °, the shift changes the number of bids by (u ¡ °)(¡dp). When u is large, the
second e®ect is also positive and so the expected number of bids increases. When u is small, the
second e®ect is negative but in this case the marginal increase in u is large enough to make the
¯rst e®ect dominate the second, again increasing the expected number of bids.
The dependence of the expected loan rate on the screening cost has a similar hump shape,
although the peak of the e®ect occurs at a higher level c¤ > cA. It is easy to understand why the
expected loan rate increases with the screening cost when c < cA. In this case, uninformed banks
do not bid and so the highest bid by banks G is ¯xed at 1. The lowest bid must increase with
c in order to produce a higher expected pro¯t for banks G to cover the increased screening cost.
In fact, since bids are concentrated near low levels, the higher screening cost increases bids in the
sense of ¯rst-order stochastic dominance. When c > cA, the lowest bid by banks G continues to
increase with n. But, since banks U participate in bidding and their bids fall when n increases,
the high end of the winning bid distribution gets thinner and the low end moves up, creating
the bulge in the middle. The overall e®ect of a higher n on the expected loan rate is ambiguous.
When c is close to cA, there are few uninformed banks in bidding and so the e®ect of the rising
lowest bid by banks G dominates, generating a rising expected loan rate. When c is close to
c0, almost all banks in bidding are uninformed and so the e®ect of the falling bids by banks U
dominates, generating a lower expected loan rate.
23The e®ects of the screening cost on the loan market tightness and the loan rate are illustrated
in the following example:
Example 8 ® = 0:65, ° = 0:7, y = 1:89, n = nn ´ 6. These parameters satisfy Assumption
2. In this case, the highest screening cost that induces positive screening is cH = 0:14. Figure
2a depicts the screening probability of each bank and bank U's participation probability; Figure 2b
depicts the loan market tightness and the expected loan rate. As discussed above, when c increases,
p falls, u increases and the graphs of (Tg;Rg) both have a hump shape.7
These e®ects of the screening cost show that, for any given number of banks, two economies
can be quite di®erent in the screening cost and yet exhibit similar loan market characteristics such
as the average loan rate and the loan market tightness. In one economy, the active bidders are all
informed and have high valuations of the project. In the other economy, most active bidders are
uninformed and whose chance of winning is often spoiled by a few informed bidders. Although
these two economies have similar market characteristics, they have opposite responses to policies
that reduce the screening cost. With informed bidders (the ¯rst economy), the policy reduces
the market tightness and lowers the loan rate by increasing the number of informed bidders.
With mostly uninformed bidders (the second economy), the policy also increases the number of
informed bidders but it has a much greater adverse e®ect on the number of uninformed bidders,
leading to a tighter market and a higher expected loan rate. The economy with informed bidders
has more dispersed loan rates than the economy with mostly uninformed bidders.
Therefore, it is ambiguous whether a policy that only reduces the screening cost moderately
can improve competition among banks in providing cheaper and more available loans. An unam-
biguous measure of increased competition when the screening cost is lower is that the expected
pro¯t is lower for banks, but this would be di±cult to measure empirically. There is a sense,
however, that a signi¯cant reduction in the screening cost can increase competition by reducing
7Although expected loan rates appear large in the ¯gure, they are clearly reasonable if each period is interpreted
as 5 years.
24the loan rate, since the expected loan rate is lower when the screening cost is close to zero than
when the cost is high (see Figure 2b).
4.3 E®ects of Reducing the Concentration of Banks
We now turn to the in°uence of the number of banks on the loan rate and the loan market
tightness. The following Proposition can be established (see Appendix E for a proof):
Proposition 9 For any ¯xed c 2 (0;c0), equilibrium screening probability is a decreasing function
of the number of banks. The loan market tightness is an increasing function of n if and only if
c < c¤¤, where c¤¤ ¸ cA.
Equilibrium screening probability decreases when n increases because, for any given p 2
[0;pH], the expected screening pro¯t of a bank G is a decreasing function of n. To cover the
screening cost, each bank's screening probability must fall when n increases.
The loan market can become tighter when there are more banks, as in the case c < cA. This
seemingly paradoxical result arises because the reduction in the screening probability induced by
an increase in the number of banks is more than o®setting the increase in the number of banks
itself. The dominating intensive e®ect is a manifestation of the negative informational externality
to an informed winner. In particular, when the true quality is bad, fewer banks receive signal g
and hence fewer banks bid than when the true quality is good. For any given bid, if it has won
it must have done so more often when the true quality is bad than when the quality is good.
This rational inference by the winner reduces the expected pro¯t. The increase in the number
of banks exacerbates this negative informational externality of winning and reduces a bank G's
expected pro¯t beyond the conventional competition e®ect. This calls for a large reduction in the
screening probability that increases the market tightness.
To be more precise, let us consider the case c < cA and rewrite










25This is the expected pro¯t of a bank G with a bid rgH = 1, which is the same as the expected
pro¯t generated by any other bid in the support of Fg. The conventional competition e®ect of
an increased n is captured by the term (1 ¡ °p)n¡1, which is the probability that the bid rgH
wins when the true quality is good. An increase in n reduces this winning probability for any
given p > 0 and hence calls for a reduction in p to cover the screening cost. The informational
externality of winning to a bank G is captured by the term [:]n¡1, which is the relative likelihood
of winning when the true project is bad as opposed to when the quality is good. For any given
p > 0, an increase in n increases this relative likelihood and hence reduces the expected pro¯t.
This additional e®ect calls for a further reduction in the screening probability and an increased
loan market tightness.
The negative informational externality to an informed winner is stronger when each bank
screens with a higher probability. This is because, as the screening probability increases, the
expected number of banks that receive signal g when the true quality is good increases more
quickly than the expected number of banks that receive signal g when the true quality is bad.
That is, for any given bid, the chance of winning against a randomly selected bank when the true
quality is bad rises relative to that when the true quality is good. Thus, the gap between the two
is more responsive to changes in n, leading to a stronger negative informational externality. This
can be con¯rmed by showing that the derivative of the term [:]n¡1 in (31) with respect to n is an
increasing function of p.
An implication is that the negative informational externality to an informed winner is weaker
when uninformed banks also participate in bidding than when they do not, making the screening
probability less responsive to further increases in n in the former case. Put di®erently, the
informational content of winning to an informed winner is contaminated by uninformed bids and
the degree of contamination increases with n. Since winning by a bank G against uninformed
banks does not reveal anything new about the project quality in addition to the bank's own signal
and since an increase in n increases the number of uninformed banks in bidding when u > 0,
26an increase in n does not increase the negative informational externality by as much as when
u = 0. Moreover, the increase in the number of uninformed bidders itself eases the loan market
tightness. Therefore, when c > cA, increases in n may not increase the market tightness. In fact,
when c is su±ciently large, almost all bidders are uninformed and so the negative informational
externality to an informed winner is dominated by other forces described above. In this case, the
loan market becomes less tight when n increases.
In comparison to the e®ect of an increase in the number of banks on the market tightness,
the e®ects on the expected loan rate are more di±cult to detail analytically. To illustrate, we
give three numerical examples. The three examples di®er among themselves in the level of the
screening cost but have the same values of (®;°;y) as in Example 8. The lowest value of n is
nL = 3, the highest value is nH = 15, and c0 = 0:14.
Example 10 Low screening cost: c = cc = 0:056. Figure 3a shows how equilibrium screening
probability, the market tightness and the expected loan rate vary with n; Figure 3b shows the
distribution of the winning bids for n = nL and nH, denoted FWg(¢;n;c) for given (n;c).
In this example, the screening cost is su±ciently low that only banks G bid for all n 2 [nL;nH].
As the number of banks increases, eachbank reduces the screening probability andthe loanmarket
gets tighter. The lowest bid rgL does not change with n since it is pinned down by the screening
cost (setting EMg = c in (26)). The highest bid does not change with n either since it is ¯xed
at 1. However, the density of bids is less concentrated at low bids when n is large since fewer
banks bid. Shown in Figure 3b, the winning bid distribution with a higher n dominates that with
a smaller n (see Figure 3b). The expected loan rate increases (see Figure 3a).
Example 11 High screening cost: c = cc = 0:119. Figure 4a shows how equilibrium screening
probability, the participation probability of a bank U, the market tightness and the expected loan
rate vary with n; Figure 4b shows the distribution of the winning bids for n = nL and nH.
27In this example, the screening cost is su±ciently high that banks U also participate in bidding
for all n 2 [nL;nH]. Again, the increase in the number of banks reduces each bank's screening
probability by reducing the expected pro¯t from screening. The increased number of banks also
increases the competition among uninformed banks and so the participation rate u falls. Despite
this reduction in the participation probability, the total number of uninformed banks in bidding
increases as a result of the increased total number of banks, leading to a less tight loan market.
On loan rates, the reduction in the screening probability increases bids by banks G as in the
previous example. Shown in Figure 4b, the distribution of the winning bids submitted by banks
G tilts toward higher bids when n is higher. However, bids by uninformed banks decrease as there
are more uninformed banks in bidding. The distribution of the winning bids submitted by banks
U tilts toward lower bids, producing the bulging shape of the distribution in the middle. The
overall e®ect of the increase in n on the expected loan rate is ambiguous in general but, for the
current example, is negative as shown in Figure 4a. Since the winning bids are more concentrated
in the middle with a higher n, the standard deviation of the winning bids is likely to fall.
Example 12 Moderate screening cost: c = cc = 0:098. Figure 5a shows how equilibrium screen-
ing probability, the participation probability of a bank U, the market tightness and the expected
loan rate vary with n; Figure 5b shows the distribution of the winning bids for n = nL and nH.
In this example, increases in the number of banks change the nature of the equilibrium. For
n < 9, the screening probability is high, which deters uninformed banks from participating in
bidding. In this case, the loan market tightness and the expected loan rate behave very like those
in Example 10. For n > 9, the screening probability is su±ciently low that uninformed banks can
participate in bidding without making a loss. For n > 9, the loan market becomes less tight with
the increase in n, as in Example 11. In contrast to Example 11, the participation probability by
uninformed banks increases with n. Also, the expected loan rate increases with n, because the
number of banks U in bidding is not signi¯cant. The distribution of the winning bids when n is
higher dominates the one when n is lower (see Figure 5b).
28Several results emerge from these numerical examples. First, a market with fewer banks can
provide both a lower loan rate and a higher availability of loans than a market with more banks,
as shown in Figure 3. The result is consistent with empirical ¯ndings by Petersen and Rajan
(1995). Di®erent from the explanation by Petersen and Rajan (1995), which relies on the bank's
monopoly power to extract gains from a continued relationship, our result comes from banks'
screening decisions and it is not an inevitable one. Key to our result is the e®ect of the number
of banks on the negative informational externality to an informed winner, which depends on the
composition of the bidders. When most bidders are informed, a more concentrated loan market
produces a lower average loan rate and more available loans. When there are su±ciently many
uninformed bidders in the market, a more concentrated market produces a higher average loan
rate and less available loans, as conventional price theory suggests.
Second, in most cases the increase in the number of banks has a greater e®ect on the market
tightness than on the expected loan rate. In Examples 10 and 11, the market tightness responds
to n signi¯cantly but the expected loan rate remains almost °at. Only in Example 12 and only
for n large enough does the increase in n have a sizable e®ect on the expected loan rate. The
small magnitude in the response of the expected loan rate occurs here because, when a bank
responds to an increase in n, it changes both the participation probability and the bids; these
two have opposite e®ects on the expected loan rate. This might explain why the degree of bank
concentration empirically has a stronger e®ect on loan availability than on loan rates (Petersan
and Rajan (1994)).
Third, a lower expected loan rate does not always indicate a less tight loan market. In
Example 12 when n increases above 9, the probability of obtaining a loan increases (as Tg falls)
but the expected loan rate increases. Despite this disagreement, the two measures are consistent
in most cases. They respond to changes in the screening cost in the same way and move in the
same direction for either high or low c when n changes.
294.4 Discussion
In this subsection we further discuss the result that increasing the number of banks can reduce
loan availability and increase the average loan rate. We do so by comparing this result with the
similar one in Petersen and Rajan (1995).
First, as in Petersen and Rajan (1995), the result implies that the \quality" of projects
¯nanced in areas with a high bank concentration is lower than in areas with a low concentration,
where the meaning of \quality" di®ers from that in previous sections and refers to the prior
probability of project success, ®. That is, a combination of a lower ® and a smaller n generates
the same market tightness as a combination of a higher ® and a larger n. This can be shown
by establishing that the iso-tightness condition, Tg = constant, generates a positive relationship
between n and ® when c < cA. Intuitively, when ® increases, a bank G's expected pro¯t increases
for any given screening probability and so the zero net-pro¯t condition implies that the screening
probability must increase. This reduces the market tightness for any given n. Since the tightness
is an increasing function of n in this case, to maintain a constant tightness the number of banks
must increase.
Second, in contrast to Petersen and Rajan (1995), the positive relationship between n and
the market tightness relies on there being su±ciently many informed bidders and hence is not
an inevitable prediction of the current theory. Also, for suitable parameters such as the ones in
Example 12, it is possible that loans are less available in the not-so-competitive market than in
both the highly concentrated and the highly competitive markets. This result, although docu-
mented in Petersen and Rajan (1995) (pp428-431), is inconsistent with their story that relies on
ex post monopoly power. It is consistent with the screening decision here. In the highly concen-
trated market, every bank screens and so each participates in bidding with a high probability,
making loans highly available. In the highly competitive market, almost every bank chooses to
be uninformed but it is possible that every bank participates in bidding with a high probability,
again making loans highly available.
30Third, in contrast to Petersen and Rajan (1995), our result does not rely on the intertemporal
trade-o® that banks make via their monopoly power. In particular, the project described here
yields output once and there is no further stage of ¯nancing involved. In this sense the result
is more robust and suitable for loan markets that involve new and small businesses, from whom
banks cannot expect much from a continued relationship since the ¯rms' expected survivorship is
low. Despite the absence of an intertemporal structure, our model can be used to indirectly check
whether it is roughly consistent with the empirical ¯nding by Petersen and Rajan (1995) that
loan rates decline more slowly with ¯rms' age in a highly concentrated market than in a highly
competitive market. This can be done by interpreting an increase in ®, the prior probability of
the project's success, as a proxy for the ¯rm's age. This interpretation is reasonable since a ¯rm's
good quality is increasingly revealed to the public when the ¯rm's survivorship increases. When
® increases, our model is capable of producing the age-pattern of loan rates described by Petersen
and Rajan (1995) if the increase in ® su±ciently increases the participation rate of uninformed
banks. This is because increases in the participation rate drive down the average loan rate more
quickly in a market with more banks than in a market with fewer banks.8
5 Conclusion
The mere presence of more banks in a market does not imply more available and cheaper loans.
The active participationof more banks inloan provisions does. Whether a bank chooses to actively
compete in providing a loan for a project is determined by the expected pro¯t to banks from
such participation. When banks can obtain private information about the project's quality by
screening, loan market competition generates a negative informational externality to the winning
bank, which can reduce banks' incentive to screen the project and to participate in competition
in the ¯rst place. This externality arises because, for any given loan rate, a bank's chance of
winning is greater when the project's quality is bad than when the quality is good; thus winning
increases the expectation that the quality is bad.
8A numerical example is as follows: ° = 0:7, y = 2:19, c = 0:072, n1 = 4, and n2 = 10. As ® increases from 0:7
to 0:8, the expected loan rate is ¯rst lower with n1 ¯rms than with n2 ¯rms and then the pattern is reversed.
31The informational externality is exacerbated by the increase in the number of banks in the
market. Therefore, in a market with more banks, each bank's screening probability can be much
lower and the number of active competitors can be smaller, making loans less available and the
expected loan rate higher than in a market with just a few banks. This is the case when the
screening cost is not very high, in which case each bank's screening probability is high and elastic
with respect to changes in the expected pro¯t from competition. In contrast, when the screening
cost is high, each bank's screening probability is low which allows uninformed banks to bid as
well. In this case, the negative informational externality to an informed winner is weak and an
increase in the number of banks in the market increases the number of uninformed banks in
bidding, making loans more available and cheaper.
There are two policy implications. First, policies that reduce the barrier for banks to enter
a market can make loans more expensive and less available to new and small businesses when
the screening cost is not very high. Second, markets that have similar loan rates and tightness
may di®er substantially in the screening cost. Policies that marginally reduce the screening
cost can achieve opposite e®ects in these markets. When the screening cost is low, reducing it
further lowers the loan rate and the market tightness; when the screening cost is high, reducing it
marginally increases the loan rate and the market tightness. To create an unambiguous bene¯t,
the policy must reduce the screening cost substantially.
There are two important questions that we plan to address in future researches. First, How
do loan rates and loan availability evolve dynamically? In particular, in a continuing relationship
between an entrepreneur and a lending bank, the realization of the project's output in each period
reveals information about the \common value" of the project, which will a®ect future loan rates
and availability in the ensuing bidding. Examining the time-pattern of loan rates and availability
is interesting but such an examination must await the development of a dynamic auction theory.
Second, What is the optimal mechanism for an entrepreneur to obtain external ¯nancing? For
example, it appears that the entrepreneur can improve the loan terms when the screening cost
32is low by simply restricting the number of banks to contact. Although this is true in the current
context, it is perhaps not an interesting venue to explore the optimal mechanism since the loan
market consists of many rather than one entrepreneur. With many entrepreneurs, it is less clear
whether a single entrepreneur would want to limit the contacts { there might be a chance to
be left out. Examining the competition in optimal mechanisms when there are many banks and
entrepreneurs should lead us to a new theory of loan market competition.
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34Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. For banks G, imposing mg(r) = mg(rH) for all r 2 [rL;rH] solves the inverse of F.
It can be veri¯ed that mg(rH) is an increasing function of rH. Then, rH = rb: If rH < rb, a
bank G could gain by deviating to a bid slightly higher than rH. Substituting rH = rb into the
expected pro¯t function yields mg(rH) = Mg as given by (10). Setting F(rL) = 0 solves rL as in
(8). The function F implicitly de¯ned by (9) is continuous and di®erentiable over the support.
Also, F0(r) = 1=H0(F(r)) > 0 and so F is indeed a cdf. There is no incentive for a bank G to
deviate from the described strategy. Deviations to bids lower than rL earn a pro¯t smaller than
Mg and deviations to bids higher than rb earn a zero pro¯t.
For banks B, the argument for a zero-pro¯t at the bid rb has already been made in the text.
We show that there is no incentive for a bank B to deviate from rb. Clearly, deviations to bids
higher than rb will never win and hence will always generate a zero payo®. Consider deviations
to bids below rb, say at a level r¤. The expected pro¯t is
mb(r¤) =
(r¤y ¡ 1)®(1 ¡°)[1¡ °F(r¤)]n¡1 ¡(1 ¡®)°[1 ¡(1¡ °)F(r¤)]n¡1
(1¡ °)® +°(1 ¡®)
:
If r¤ < rL, then F(r¤) = 0 and it can be shown that mb(r¤) < mb(rL) < 0. If rL · r¤ < rb, then
we can substitute the term (r¤y ¡ 1)®[1 ¡°F(r¤)]n¡1 from (6) to rewrite
mb(r¤) =
(1¡ °)[°® +(1 ¡°)(1 ¡ ®)]Mg ¡ (1¡ ®)(2° ¡ 1)[1 ¡(1 ¡°)F(r¤)]n¡1
°[(1¡ °)® +°(1 ¡®)]
:
This is an increasing function of r¤ and so the best deviation is r¤ = rb ¡ ", where " > 0 is
arbitrarily small. In this case, however, substituting Mg from (10) and setting F(r¤) = 1 yields
mb(r¤) < 0.
B Proof of Lemma 3
First, we show that the supports of the three bid distributions, (Fg;Fu;Fb), do not overlap except
for the endpoints. Since the proof is similar, we show the result only for the pair (Fg;Fu). Suppose,
to the contrary, that [rgL;rgH] \ [ruL;ruH] = [r1;r2], with r1 6= r2. Then ms(r) = ms(r2) for all
35r 2 [r1;r2] and s = g;u. Using (18), we can rewrite these requirements as
"
Pr(q = gjs = g); ¡Pr(q = bjs = g)
Pr(q = gjs = u);¡Pr(q = bjs = u)
#"
(yr ¡ 1)W(rjq = g) ¡ (yr2 ¡1)W(r2jq = g)
W(rjq = b) ¡ W(r2jq = b)
#
= 0:
The above coe±cient matrix is invertible and so W(rjq = b) = W(r2jq = b) for all r 2 [r1;r2].
This cannot hold, since Fg(r) or Fu(r) is strictly increasing in r for some r 2 (r1;r2), implying
that W(rjq = b) is strictly decreasing in r for some r 2 (r1;r2). Thus, Fg and Fu do not have
overlapping supports except for the endpoints.
Next, we show that ruL = rgH if u > 0. The proof for rbL = ruH when b > 0 is similar.
Suppose, to the contrary, that u > 0 but ruL 6= rgH. We have four cases.
Case (i): ruH = rgL ´ r¤. In this case the support of Fb does not cover (ruL;rgH), since the
supports of any two bid distributions cannot overlap. That is, Fb(r) is constant (either 0 or 1)
for all r 2 (ruL;rgH) and we use F¤
b to denote it. When u > 0, the payo® to a bank U in this
case can be obtained from (18) as follows:
Emu(r 2 [ruL;r¤])=(yr ¡ 1)®[1 ¡(1 ¡p)uFu(r) ¡(1 ¡°)pbF¤
b ]n¡1
¡(1¡ ®)[1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)uFu(r) ¡ °pbF¤
b ]n¡1:
Since Emu is constant over the support, then Em0
u(r) = 0 for all r 2 [ruL;r¤]. In particular,
Em0

















A1 = 1 ¡(1 ¡p)u ¡(1 ¡°)pbF¤
b ; A2 = 1 ¡(1 ¡p)u ¡°pbF¤
b :
There is a pro¯table opportunity for a bank G to deviate. In particular, consider a deviation by
a bank G to bidding r¤ ¡ ", where " > 0 is arbitrarily small. The payo® is
Emg(r¤ ¡")=[y(r¤ ¡")¡ 1)]®°[1 ¡(1 ¡p)uFu(r¤ ¡") ¡(1 ¡°)pbF¤
b ]n¡1
¡(1 ¡®)(1¡ °)[1 ¡(1 ¡p)uFu(r¤ ¡")¡ °pbF¤
b ]n¡1:
















36This is violated for r > 1=2, given (32).
Case (ii): ruH < rgL and the support of Fb is not a subset of [ruH;rgL]. In this case, Fb(r)
is again constant (either 0 or 1) for all r 2 (ruL;rgH). The payo® to a bank U from bidding
r 2 [ruL;ruH] is
Emu = (yruH ¡1)®[1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)u ¡ (1 ¡ °)pbF¤
b ]n¡1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)[1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)u ¡ °pbF¤
b ]n¡1:
This is an increasing function of ruH. That is, if a bank U deviates from the distribution Fu
and bids slightly higher than ruH, the bid has the same winning probability as ruH does and yet
receives a higher pro¯t when it wins. Thus, ruH < rgL cannot be an equilibrium in this case.
Case (iii): ruH < rgL and the support of Fb is a subset of [ruH;rgL]. In this case, rbH · rgL,
but this cannot hold in equilibrium, as the same arguments in Cases (i) and (ii) can be repeated
for the pair (Fg;Fb) to yield a contradiction.
Case (iv): ruH > rgL. In this case, we must have ruL ¸ rgH, since the supports of Fg and Fu
cannot overlap except for the endpoints. Since ruL 6= rgH by the supposition, then ruL > rgH. If
the support of Fb is not a subset of [rgH;ruL], then the argument in Case (ii) shows that there
is incentive for a bank G to deviate to a bid slightly higher than rgH. If the support of Fb is a
subset of [rgH;ruL], then rbH · ruL, but this cannot be consistent with an equilibrium since the
arguments in Cases (i) and (ii) can be repeated for the pair (Fu;Fb) to yield a contradiction.
Therefore, rgH = ruL. This completes the proof of the Lemma.
C Proof of Proposition 4
We ¯rst show b = 0. Suppose, to the contrary, b > 0. Then the expected pro¯t for a bank B
must be non-negative which, by (18), requires






[1 ¡(1 ¡°)p ¡(1 ¡p)u]n¡1:
Substituting this into (18) for s = u one can show that mu(ruH) > 0 (note ruH = rbL). Thus,














which is infeasible under Assumption 2. Thus, b = 0.
Next, we can show u < 1 for all p > 0: If u = 1, one can calculate the expected pro¯t for a
bank U from (18) and show that it is negative for any p > 0 under Assumption 2.
Now if a bank U participates in bidding, it must be indi®erent between bidding and not
bidding (since u < 1). The payo® from bidding must be zero. Substituting b = 0 into (18) for
s = u and setting mu(r) = 0 yields (22). Setting Fu(ruL) = 0 in (22) gives (21). Also, since
banks B do not bid, ruH = 1 by the proof of Lemma 3 (Case (ii) there). Setting r = 1 in (22)
and solving for u yields (20). Then u > 0 if and only if p < pA(n). When p < pA(n), the cdf
Fu de¯ned implicitly by (22) has a positive derivative for all r 2 (ruL;ruH) and so has a positive
density. Moreover, it can be veri¯ed that u(p;n) decreases with p and ruL(p;n) increases with p.
Finally, we need to show that there is no incentive for a bank U to deviate from the bid
distribution Fu, given that other banks U use Fu and that other banks G use Fg described later
in proposition 5. The proof for this part follows a similar procedure to that used in Case (i) in
the proof of Lemma 3.
D Proof of Proposition 7
We ¯rst verify that Tg has the described dependence on c. The same property can be con¯rmed
for Tb in the same way. Recall that u > 0 i® c > cA. When c > cA, substituting u from (20) into
(29) yields Tg = pn( 1
pA ¡°)n, which is an increasing function of p and hence a decreasing function
of c. When c < cA, substituting u = 0 into (29) yields Tg = (1 ¡ °p)n, which is a decreasing
function of p and hence an increasing function of c.
For the e®ect of c on Rg, examine ¯rst the case c < cA. In this case, setting u = 0 and


















38where z = 1=(p¡1 ¡ °) is an increasing function of p. It can be veri¯ed that [(1 + x)n ¡ 1]=x is
an increasing function of x for any x > 0. Then Rg is a decreasing function of z and hence a
decreasing function of p. Since p decreases with c, Rg is an increasing function of c.







n(2° ¡ 1)(x ¡1 + °)n¡1 + (xA ¡°)n ¡(xA ¡ 1 +°)n
xn ¡ (xA ¡ °)n
)
;
where x = 1=p and xA = 1=pA(n). The derivative of Rg with respect to x has the same sign as
that of h(x) where
h(x)=n(1 ¡°) ¡ x ¡(n¡ 1)x1¡n(xA ¡°)n
+
(x¡1+°)2¡n
2°¡1 [(xA ¡ 1 +°)n ¡ (xA ¡ °)n]:
This is clearly negative when x ! 1. Thus, dRg=dc < 0 when c is close to but lower than c0.




























(Y ¡Y 2¡n)(Y + 1)n¡1 ¡(n¡ 1)(Y ¡ 1)
i
The expression in [:] is an increasing function of Y and has value 0 when Y = 1. Thus, h(x) > 0,
i.e., dRg=dc > 0 when c is close to cA. Thus, there exists c¤ 2 (cA;c0) such that dRg=dc > 0 for
all c < c¤. This completes the proof of Proposition 7.
E Proof of Proposition 9
To prove the proposition, we ¯rst establish the following lemma:
Lemma 13 The following relations hold for all p > 0:








39Proof. The left-hand side of (33) is a decreasing function of p and has a value zero when
p = 0. Thus (33) is evident. Computing the derivative in (34) shows that it has the same sign as
that of the left-hand side of (33) and so it is negative.
We now show that equilibrium screening probability is a decreasing function of n. Di®erenti-


















(1¡°p)n¡2 ln[1¡ (1¡ °)p]
)
, if c < cA, (36)
where








Clearly, dp=dn < 0 for c > cA. When 0 < c < cA, EMg > 0 implies
y > 1 +
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ °)
®°
µ









(1 ¡°p)[1 ¡ (1 ¡ °)p]
(n ¡1)(2° ¡ 1)
fln[1 ¡(1 ¡°)p] ¡ln(1¡ °p)g > 0: (38)
Thus, dp=dn < 0 for c 2 (0;cA) as well.
To show the dependence of Tg on n, examine ¯rst the case c < cA. Di®erentiate Tg = (1¡°p)n


















Using (34) it can be verify that the expression in f:g is an increasing function of p and that its
value at p = 0 is positive. Thus, dTg=dn > 0 for c < cA.
For c > cA, let » = 1=(n¡1) and ¾ = ®(y¡1)=(1¡®) > 1. Solving p as a function of c from




















40The following two properties can be veri¯ed: (i) dlnTg=d» is an increasing function of c=c0; (ii)
dlnTg=d» > 0 when c ! c0. Thus, there exists some c1 < c0 such that Tg is an increasing function
of » and hence a decreasing function of n if and only if c > c1. The level c1 may or may not be
greater than cA. Since the current case is restricted to c > cA, let c¤¤ = maxfc1;cAg. Then Tg is
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